From Copenhagen to Paris: Low Expectations
In the run-up to Copenhagen, there was widespread hope that the conference would lead to a legally binding agreement that would include commitments that would keep global temperatures within tolerable levels. None of that happened. Copenhagen did lead to widespread agreement that an increase in global average temperatures of more than 2 degrees Celsius would be intolerable (though the small island states wanted a 1.5 degree goal, which they need to survive). The developed countries also agreed to come up with $100 billion annually, starting in 2020, to assist in mitigation and adaptation measures in the developing countries.
As we head to Paris, the expectations are profoundly lower. The national commitments that countries are putting on the table (“Intended Nationally Determined Contributions”) do not add up to nearly enough to keep us within 2 degrees; instead the plan is to come back every five years and hopefully do better. Nor will they be legally binding; fulfillment of them will be monitored and reported, but there will be no sanctions for missing them, and no one can sue to enforce them. (To be fair, even though the Kyoto reduction requirements were legally binding in theory, there were no meaningful sanctions available for missing them, either.)
It is still mathematically possible to stay within 2 degrees, but the odds of actually doing so seem to be receding by the month.
The $100 billion plan is still on the books, but the pledges made so far are well short of what is needed even for the first year. And there is growing evidence that, even if that amount of money were found every year, it would not be nearly enough to meet the needs—especially if temperatures are on a pathway well above 2 degrees.
One encouraging development is that it was unclear before and during Copenhagen whether China would commit to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions. China’s emissions are continuing to grow at a rapid pace and dominate the world picture, but the central government of the country has made serious promises to cap emissions (though not until 2030), and is participating much more fully in the international climate regime than it did in 2009.
On the other hand, in 2009 there were still real prospects for U.S. climate legislation; the White House and both the Senate and the House were controlled by Democrats who favored such legislation. Today, however, both the Senate and the House are controlled by Republicans who reject the basic science of climate change and are doing everything they can to stand in the way of President Obama’s use of existing statutory authority to fight climate change.
Thus the results of the U.S. national election in November 2016 will be even more important for the future of the global climate than the outcome of the Paris conference. (For a look at how the presidential candidates stack up on climate policy, check out this recent story by Renee Cho on State of the Planet.)
This post is one in a series reflecting on what has changed since the climate talks of 2009 in Copenhagen. Gerrard was among those writing for State of the Planet about those talks back in 2009, contributing several reports, which you can find in this compilation of stories about the Copenhagen talks. Here is an excerpt:
Many people, including myself, are now looking through the documents and trying to figure out just what they mean. But it is clear that the conference achieved neither a universally accepted binding legal agreement that would have assured a dramatic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (and perhaps have denoted a return of the Age of Miracles), nor a complete breakdown. …
Major fights lie ahead about whether the measures agreed to will succeed in meeting the developed countries’ goal of keeping future increases in global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius; whether achieving even that goal will be sufficient to prevent catastrophic damage in some of the most vulnerable countries; and many other issues. It is also highly uncertain whether the conference’s results will make the U.S. Senate more or less likely to approve U.S. legislation.